An Objective History of the Conflict in the Pacific

In response to the title of this blog, according to history teacher/maestro Dr Bruce Dennett, there is no objective history of conflict in the Pacific. 

In teaching the International Studies in Peace and Conflict portion of the Modern History HSC syllabus, the task of diving into the Conflict in the Pacific (Option D) seems deceptively simple. Look at it on the immediate level:

• It's a linear study of WWII, something that some Modern History students will be craving after all their studies of WWI and 1930s European politics. 
• It involves Australia, and is part of Australia's national identity. 
• It features two big keystones that appeal to many budding historians: the bombing of Pearl Harbour and the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 

Listening to Bruce Dennett at the HTA Senior History HSC Study Day, it quickly becomes very clear that the conflict in the Pacific is an incredibly complex area of historical study that rewards sophisticated historical thinking. I know this, and you know this, but to hear him pull apart the history to destroy any semblance of objectivity is something else entirely. 

Incidentally, if you ever get a chance to see Dennett speak at one of these HTA days, you should jump right onto it. He's exceptionally well-read and very clever in his insights into well-trodden areas of history but, most importantly for any students in the audience, he's also very entertaining and engaging and a key architect of the Modern History HSC syllabus.  

In his lecture on the Conflict in the Pacific, Dennett asserts that Modern History students need to engage with the historiography in order to construct, in the words of the HSC rubric, a sophisticated response. Rather than trying to befuddle our students' minds with the mechanics of historiography or expecting them to memorise a plethora of relevant historians, it instead becomes useful to present contradictory truths about the war and ask students to build their own sustained arguments that touch on both sides of such debates. 

So, as Dennett says, the war was not inevitable, the Allied victory was not inevitable. The only tactic available to MacArthur was not his island-hopping campaign. There are multiple sets of arguments that can be supported. There are a multiplicity of valid historical truths. There is no such thing as an objective history of conflict in the Pacific. And, what the Japanese learn about WWII is, unsurprisingly, very different to what Australians or Americans learn about.

Here are some examples of debates that students can get stuck into:

The Atomic Bombs: There are arguments to be made for the atomic bomb being completely unnecessary, just as there are arguments that can be made about the atomic bombs saving lives in both Japan and elsewhere.

Hirohito and the Reasons for War: In one version of events, Hirohito was an aggressor hellbent on imperial domination of Asia, and completely unjustified in expanding across the Pacific - guilty of countless atrocities and invasions. In another version of events, Hirohito did not want war but was forced into it by 'ABCD' encirclement (Americans, British, Chinese, Dutch). When the Japanese started their war against China it felt justified as, in living memory, they had faced subjugation by the Chinese Empire. Japan also remembered when Commodore Perry (an American) forced them to open trade with the West through thinly-veiled threats of naval attack in the 19th century.

Beliefs about Defeating the Enemy: Were both sides essentially working off the same strategy? The Japanese believed that if they destroyed 10 American warships then this would cripple the U.S. fleet beyond repair. The American strategy, Plan Orange, led to a transition from a major naval confrontation to 'island hopping', and debates amongst Americans over which was more effective - naval or air power.

Growth of Pacific Tensions: How much knowledge did President Roosevelt have of the incoming Japanese attacks that would prompt U.S. involvement in the war? Were American blockades of the Japanese in the 1930s designed to weaken the Japanese so that they were unable to fight a war? Were both America and the Japanese trying to out-manoeuvre each other before any active war broke out?

The War Crimes Tribunal: How badly should Japan have been punished? Were the War Crimes Trials about punishment of the Japanese at the hands of the Allies? Or was it a process of rehabilitation for America to build a new Cold War ally?

MacArthur: Was he a legend? Or was it only in his own mind? Arguments can be made (to the contrary of the usual interpretation) that he should have been court-martialed for his role in leaving the Philippines woefully unprepared in 1941, and that he only had any real personal success after the American occupation of Japan had begun.

So, as said, multiple truths!