Why Germany Lost WWI

Although credited with the strategy that kicked off Germany's invasion of France, Alfred von Schlieffen died at the age of 79 one year before the outbreak of WWI.

About a year and a half ago I was fortunate enough to see Richard Evans speak at the University of Sydney. The focus of his talk was on the rise of Germany's Weimar Republic in the 1930s and how it was able to last so long. Flipping the usual historical approach in which Modern Teachers ask the driving question, "Why did it fail?", Evans posited the approach of "Why did the Weimar Republic last as long as it did?" It was a fascinating talk and it reminds me of another talk I saw, a bit later, given by Dr Bruce Dennett about Germany and WWI, this time asking the question "Why did Germany lose the war?" 

It's a different way of looking at the turning points of WWI, shifting the narrative focus from the entry of America and withdrawal of Russia to a collection of cumulative factors that contributed to Germany's eventual collapse in 1918. This approach encourages students to think of the bigger picture when it comes to WWI; about which events were most significant, why people might contest the significance of certain events as contributing factors to German failure, and how the chain of cause and effect can be interpreted.

Here's a resource that summarises this approach.

The main reasons given include:

• The failure of the Schlieffen Plan. This was a strategy that was dependent on France and England being beaten within 40 days. That didn't happen, partially due to General von Moltke making changes to the plan, and the fact that the plan required already demoralised soldiers to march an unreasonable distance.
• The Germans were fighting a war on two fronts - France and Russia. The fighting on the eastern front prevented the Germans from sending enough troops to win in the west.
• The nature of trench warfare meant that the defending side always had the advantage. Neither side had the weapons or numbers to punch their way through to victory. 
• The British naval blockade of the Germans meant that shortages on the German homefront were exacerbated further.
• German generals could not break free of the 'war of attrition' mindset that had them believe the only way of winning was to overwhelm the enemy with superior numbers of foot soldiers. Germany's strategy relied on the Allied armies running out of men before them, something that became increasingly unlikely as the war dragged on.
• Germany unwittingly encouraged U.S. entry into the war through their ordering of unrestricted U-boat attacks on neutral ships.
• The German homefront faced so much hardship that war weariness had set in by 1917-1918, something that would almost lead to German socialist revolution.
• Germany's allies (Turkey, Bulgaria, and Austria-Hungary) were weakening, and required German resources and troops to 'prop them up' on the southern front.

Students can read through the resource and then answer the following questions, which involve them engaging with the material in a variety of ways, such as describing, evaluating, and analysing - hitting the History Continuum in terms of Significance, Contestability, and Cause and Effect:

1. Outline the reasons historians most commonly give for Germany losing the war.
2. Rate these reasons in order of your agreement with them in terms of their significance.
3. Why is your top reason the correct one?
4. List the ways in which the Germany army's moral was breaking down.
5. Why did General Ludendorff decide to ask for an armistice?
6. Make explicit reference to Source C to describe the events leading up to the armistice of 11 November.

An Objective History of the Conflict in the Pacific

In response to the title of this blog, according to history teacher/maestro Dr Bruce Dennett, there is no objective history of conflict in the Pacific. 

In teaching the International Studies in Peace and Conflict portion of the Modern History HSC syllabus, the task of diving into the Conflict in the Pacific (Option D) seems deceptively simple. Look at it on the immediate level:

• It's a linear study of WWII, something that some Modern History students will be craving after all their studies of WWI and 1930s European politics. 
• It involves Australia, and is part of Australia's national identity. 
• It features two big keystones that appeal to many budding historians: the bombing of Pearl Harbour and the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 

Listening to Bruce Dennett at the HTA Senior History HSC Study Day, it quickly becomes very clear that the conflict in the Pacific is an incredibly complex area of historical study that rewards sophisticated historical thinking. I know this, and you know this, but to hear him pull apart the history to destroy any semblance of objectivity is something else entirely. 

Incidentally, if you ever get a chance to see Dennett speak at one of these HTA days, you should jump right onto it. He's exceptionally well-read and very clever in his insights into well-trodden areas of history but, most importantly for any students in the audience, he's also very entertaining and engaging and a key architect of the Modern History HSC syllabus.  

In his lecture on the Conflict in the Pacific, Dennett asserts that Modern History students need to engage with the historiography in order to construct, in the words of the HSC rubric, a sophisticated response. Rather than trying to befuddle our students' minds with the mechanics of historiography or expecting them to memorise a plethora of relevant historians, it instead becomes useful to present contradictory truths about the war and ask students to build their own sustained arguments that touch on both sides of such debates. 

So, as Dennett says, the war was not inevitable, the Allied victory was not inevitable. The only tactic available to MacArthur was not his island-hopping campaign. There are multiple sets of arguments that can be supported. There are a multiplicity of valid historical truths. There is no such thing as an objective history of conflict in the Pacific. And, what the Japanese learn about WWII is, unsurprisingly, very different to what Australians or Americans learn about.

Here are some examples of debates that students can get stuck into:

The Atomic Bombs: There are arguments to be made for the atomic bomb being completely unnecessary, just as there are arguments that can be made about the atomic bombs saving lives in both Japan and elsewhere.

Hirohito and the Reasons for War: In one version of events, Hirohito was an aggressor hellbent on imperial domination of Asia, and completely unjustified in expanding across the Pacific - guilty of countless atrocities and invasions. In another version of events, Hirohito did not want war but was forced into it by 'ABCD' encirclement (Americans, British, Chinese, Dutch). When the Japanese started their war against China it felt justified as, in living memory, they had faced subjugation by the Chinese Empire. Japan also remembered when Commodore Perry (an American) forced them to open trade with the West through thinly-veiled threats of naval attack in the 19th century.

Beliefs about Defeating the Enemy: Were both sides essentially working off the same strategy? The Japanese believed that if they destroyed 10 American warships then this would cripple the U.S. fleet beyond repair. The American strategy, Plan Orange, led to a transition from a major naval confrontation to 'island hopping', and debates amongst Americans over which was more effective - naval or air power.

Growth of Pacific Tensions: How much knowledge did President Roosevelt have of the incoming Japanese attacks that would prompt U.S. involvement in the war? Were American blockades of the Japanese in the 1930s designed to weaken the Japanese so that they were unable to fight a war? Were both America and the Japanese trying to out-manoeuvre each other before any active war broke out?

The War Crimes Tribunal: How badly should Japan have been punished? Were the War Crimes Trials about punishment of the Japanese at the hands of the Allies? Or was it a process of rehabilitation for America to build a new Cold War ally?

MacArthur: Was he a legend? Or was it only in his own mind? Arguments can be made (to the contrary of the usual interpretation) that he should have been court-martialed for his role in leaving the Philippines woefully unprepared in 1941, and that he only had any real personal success after the American occupation of Japan had begun.

So, as said, multiple truths!